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15 May 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Charter of the Product Review Division (PRD) of the Intelligence Community Staff

The Mission of PRD is not defined in any one document. But various official papers do describe the functions and objectives of the Division, as determined in the first instance, rather broadly, by the President (for the DCI); then, fairly specifically, by the DCI (for the D/DCI/IC); and finally, quite explicitly, by the D/DCI/IC (for PRD). Appropriate quotations from these papers, and from one additional DCI study, are listed at Annex, arranged according to source. An interpretive summary based on these quotations and arranged by principal function--product review, product improvement, and structural improvement--is provided below.

PRD Charter

Product Review: PRD is responsible for reviewing and evaluating the performance of the Community as a producer of finished intelligence.

--PRD must assess the adequacy and timeliness of reporting, the quality of presentation and analysis, and the responsiveness of the intelligence product to the consumers' needs.

--It must review the effectiveness of the Community as a conveyor of warning and as a provider of vital information during periods of crisis.

--It must, in close association with the NIOs, continue to contribute to the refinement of Key Intelligence Questions (KIQ), spur the development of the process which accompanies the KIQ procedure, and in general monitor the entire KIQ system.

Product Improvement: Pursuant to its review activities, PRD, in cooperation with other elements of the Community, is charged with proposing and implementing diverse measures to improve the utility and quality of finished intelligence.

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--It should recommend ways to provide high-level consumers with better, more timely, and less redundant products.

--It should continue to develop the concept of the "Family of National Products" and encourage the adoption of specific proposals growing out of this concept, as it applies both to serial intelligence production and production during crises.

--It should make proposals concerning the revamping of warning mechanisms, procedures, publications, and doctrines.

--It should establish a Community effort to improve analytical methods.

--It should develop regular systems (for implementation by the NIOs) to ensure that serious divergent points of view are properly expressed in finished products, and it should formulate ways to introduce systematic challenge procedures into the Community's deliberations.

--It should help the Community's production agencies to improve publication formats and production procedures.

--It should seek means to strengthen the Community's analytical resources, principally by finding ways to develop the most propitious working environments, the most effective personnel management, and the highest possible level of individual competence.

Structural Improvement: PRD, in its efforts to improve product, is responsible for concerning itself with those organizational issues and problems which affect the quality and timeliness of finished production.

--PRD must devise ways and means to ensure that unnecessary production activities are eliminated and that the Community adheres to a rational division of labor.

--It must encourage the formation of a closer and more fruitful relationship between the producers and the collectors of intelligence.

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ANNEX

The PRD Charter: Relevant Quotations from Official Documents

1. The President's directive of November 1971 specifies inter alia that:

The responsiveness of the US intelligence effort with respect to national requirements must be subject to continuing review.

Assignment of intelligence functions within the community must be reviewed and revised to eliminate inefficient, unnecessary or outmoded activities.

The quality, scope and timeliness of the community's product must be improved.

2. In response to this directive, the DCI committed himself on 6 September 1973, inter alia, to:

Through the NSCIC, determine by December 1, 1973 which national intelligence products satisfy user needs and identify new product requirements.

Achieve significant improvements in product formats and production procedures to increase responsiveness early in 1974.

Establish by December 31, 1973 procedures to enable the NSCIC and my own staff to review the responsiveness and quality of the community's product.

Review programs to upgrade the quality of intelligence personnel and improve personnel management in the community.

Undertake specific studies to evaluate the intelligence product and its worth to the consumer and eliminate intelligence collection and production effort of marginal usefulness.

Undertake selective review during the next 18 months

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of labor and increase the number of services of common concern performed within the community:

- Indications and warning intelligence
- ELINT processing and exploitation
- Current intelligence reporting
- HUMINT operations and foreign service reporting

Identify during the second quarter of FY 1974 the current needs of the users of foreign economic intelligence.

3. The DCI's Letter of Instruction to the D/DCI/IC of 13 March 1974 states that the IC Staff would be responsible for the implementation of many of the commitments listed above. Specifically, in areas of concern to PRD, the IC Staff would:

Establish and maintain a procedure for the evaluation of community efforts in analysis and production, collection and processing, and resource utilization.

Insure the evaluation of the utility of community intelligence products and advise me and the NIOs of ways and means to improve them.

Provide a focal point for DCI planning activity for the community and for the drafting and circulation of appropriate DCI guidance papers including the DCI Perspectives.

Establish a coordinated community effort to improve analytical methods and to improve the quality and acceptability of outside substantive research.

4. The D/DCI/IC in his turn instructed the Product Review Division (in his Letter of Instruction of 15 March 1974) to:

Create and maintain a staff representative of the Community capable of creating and maintaining procedures for evaluating Community efforts in analysis and production, and establish systems to perform this function effectively.

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Determine and assist in the implementation of ways to improve the Community's performance in the area of finished analytical intelligence.

Play an active role in the continuing process of refining Key Intelligence Questions and in the use of KIQs by the NIOs to evaluate Community performance.

Formulate and gain acceptance of ways to introduce a systematic challenge mechanism into the workings of the finished intelligence community.

Continue to develop the concept of the Family of National Products and to encourage the adoption of specific recommendations growing out of this concept, as it applies both to the regular, serial production of finished intelligence and to the production of intelligence in times of crisis.

Specifically concerning the latter, assess the performance of the Community in times of crisis and recommend ways to provide high-level consumers with better, more timely, and less redundant products (including warning notices) during such periods.

Establish and chair a coordinated Community effort to improve analytical methods and the quality and acceptability of outside (contract) research.

5. Finally, in a Report submitted to the NSCIC in December 1973, the DCI charged the IC Staff (and others) with a variety of actions. Among them:

In cooperation with appropriate agencies, offices, and committees, the IC Staff will sponsor and chair, perhaps on an annual basis, a review of collection products in terms of their format, timeliness, assigned priorities, and general usefulness to analytical consumers. Emphasis in this review will be placed on means to help consumers understand the significance of information provided to them.

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DDO/CIA will seek ways to provide less cryptic data concerning the reliability of sources and reports, consider the provision of more extensive evaluations of contents, and--together with production officers--develop procedures and incentives for increasing contacts and "cross-talk" between Community analysts and DDO officers.

NSA will investigate ways to highlight significant items and patterns drawn from its own COMINT and ELINT product, for the benefit of the analytical community.

NPIC will also identify additional means to permit it rapidly to highlight the significance of its own product for analysts.

The IC Staff will review the existing system of collection requirements in terms of its ability to respond quickly and effectively in crisis situations. This review will concentrate on the identification of the principal questions which need to be answered during a crisis. It will lead to the establishment of a system which would--through person-to-person contacts and lively exchanges of information and opinions--promote the search for actual information and the formulation of analytical judgments; such a system will not try to assess the data as it arrives or seek to draw up formal lists of requirements.

The Community as a whole will establish a common alert mechanism to deal with crisis situations.

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IC Staff, with all-agency participation, will develop regular systems to be implemented by the NIOs to ensure that serious divergent points of view and conflicting elements of information not be submerged by managerial fiat or the mechanism of reinforcing consensus.

Such systems will be charged in addition with ensuring that in a crisis the analytical community is aware of the significance collectors attach to the information being provided.

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Such systems will also be charged with ensuring the establishment of means to provide the views of devils' advocates, adversary procedures, and the use of gaming techniques as appropriate.

A system will be established for the regular, perhaps periodic, review of NIEs and SNIEs to determine if updated and revised versions should be issued, such reviews and such issuances to help the analytical community to focus on key problems and to recall previous wisdom.

The architects of these systems will be responsible for the setting up of regular procedures for the exchange of substantive views, ideas, and information within the Community, perhaps in normal times through periodic seminars, in times of crisis through electronic means.

A community-wide review will be undertaken under the IC Staff to determine the advisability of revamping existing warning mechanisms, procedures, publications, doctrines, and analytical methodologies; and to study ways to assign a clear warning function to production offices and analysts; and to recommend ways to establish clear guidelines for systematic presentations of probability.

The Community will consider the adoption of a coherent national family of products for publication during periods of crisis, so as to provide high-level consumers with frequent assessments and with warning advisories as appropriate, and so as to create a system which would ensure rapid coordination and the effective expression of any important divergencies of view.

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TASK ACTIVITIES OF THE ICS FOR FY 1976 BY PRIORITY  
AND ESTIMATED MANPOWER APPLICATION

STAFF ELEMENT: HUMINT BRANCH

	<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>PROJECT DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>EST. MANHOURS</u>
<u>Group 1</u>	9.1	Direct HSC Support	1070 (3)
	9.1	Other DCI Leadership/Direction HUMINT Support	250 (3)
	9.1	PFIAB Support	100 (3)
	9.1	DCI USIB Support	90 (3)
	9.1, 9.5	Joint (CIA/DOD) Staff Action [redacted] Joint Agreements)	60 (2)
<u>Group 2</u>	9.2, 9.3	Planning (National Human Source Plan)	770 (3)
	9.3	Resource Management/Allocation Matters [redacted] etc.	600 (3)
	9.4	FOCUS Assessments and Management Follow-up	600 (3)
	9.2, 9.3	Human Performance Evaluation (FOCUS)	320 (2)
	9.2, 9.3	Staff Support Military Humint (CICAG), etc.	310 (1)
	9.1	Senate and House Select Committee Requests/Briefings	250 (3)

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STAFF ELEMENT: HUMINT BRANCH (Page 2)

	<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>PROJECT DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>EST MANHOURS</u>
<u>Group 3</u>	9.4, 9.5	Coordinate Community HUMINT Programs, Maintain Liaison	600 (3)
<u>Group 4</u>	9.5	Develop, Manage and Conduct Community Orientation/Briefing/Seminar/Liaison Programs for HUMINT Collectors	400 (3)
	9.2	Develop Doctrine, Training for HUMINT Collection Skills, Prepare R&D, etc.	270 (3)
		Consolidation of Training/Schooling	200 (2)
		Field Visits	0 (3)
		Sub-Total	5890
		Staff Management & Admin Sub-Total	350
		TOTAL	6240


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16 September 1975

NOTES ON STAFF REORGANIZATION

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A. WHY REORGANIZE?

As a generalization, the best reason for any institutional reorganization is to accommodate change--a recognition on the part of the management that the present organizational structure is not meeting current demands and is even less likely to meet future conditions.

The Intelligence Community Staff is the DCI's primary staff for the management of the Community. In a real sense, it was fathered by the Presidential Memorandum of November 1971. In the intervening four years, the IC Staff has had four D/DCI/ICs and has served three DCIs. All of this is stated only to illustrate the dynamic conditions under which the Staff had to organize and adjust to its role in the Community.

The future is not likely to be less dynamic, considering the recommendations of the Rockefeller and Murphy Commissions, the activities of the House and Senate Select Committees, the Presidential election next year, and the likelihood of new legislation and/or Presidential orders during the next two years.

The present IC Staff structure predated the organization of NIOs, KIQs, KEP, Community planning, and a great deal of history that has had a sizeable impact in terms of the demands made upon it. The four preceding years have been a development and learning period as well as a doing period. However, as an executive staff, the primary problem of ICS has been one of building a set of basic corporate tools and developing a single unified staff concept for their use.

We are a long way from the above goal. However, many of the tools have been identified, some have been developed and tested in their early iterations, and still others have only been conceptually identified.

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Up until the present time, the key developmental institution of the IC Staff has clearly been MPRRD. In this sense, it has not only had to bear the load of doing and responding to the day-to-day demands, it has also been in the forefront of building. This is not a reflection upon the role or output of CPAD and PRD. The latter two divisions have also played an important role. However, by the nature of its activities, MPRRD was obliged to play the primary role. As a result, it is not surprising that as the needs of a unified staff were identified, more activities tended to be administered in an ad hoc manner. Our man hours for self-management reflect this condition. The current condition of CPAD, which is in fact seeking a new definition of its role and tasks, is also a reflection of this condition. Serious questions can be raised with respect to the widening scope of PRD activities and the amount of IC Staff man hours devoted to the RONI relative to other projects and demands.

Our acquired knowledge of our corporate staff problem, our current condition, and our expectations for the future indicate that we can no longer afford to operate without a basic Staff plan--one in which the tools are as clearly identified as possible and the basic Staff components are interrelated in a mutually-reinforcing work program with explicitly defined principal and collateral action responsibilities.

These are the reasons why IC Staff needs to reorganize and why the attached reorganization plan of the primary Staff Divisions takes on the form that it does.

#### B. A PROPOSED REORGANIZATION

A proposed reorganization of the IC Staff suggests three basic Staff Offices; Planning, Resources and Programming, and Performance Evaluation.

The primary purpose of the reorganization is the development of a unified and mutually reinforcing Staff program which best supports the DCI in his role as Community manager and principal advisor to the President and NSC on national intelligence matters.

The accomplishment of such a program is dependent upon the continued development and interrelated use of certain basic tools and documentation. At the apex of the structure

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are the current objectives and the related Key Intelligence Questions; the mid-term Objectives, expressed in terms of the mid-term perspectives and intelligence priorities of DCID 1/2; and the long-range perspectives and estimates (currently under development in IC Plans).

In the logic of the planning and programming cycle, planning precedes programming, and performance evaluation supports both functions; first, in its analysis of the experienced performance of current capabilities, and, second, in its analysis of projected or planned capabilities. This interrelated cyclical continuum is what is meant by "unified and mutually reinforcing."

The planning function allows the corporate manager to determine Community direction and strategy. Without meaningful planning, the DCI tends to react to programming actions and issues established by his individual program managers.

One consequence of the unified approach is clear. Performance evaluation must be generated primarily in the planning and programming context. The difficult task in any unified staff program is to make each action taken in support of the individual office primary mission meaningful in terms of corporate strategy and program. This is particularly true in the case of the pivotal function of performance evaluation, since it is not an end in itself but essentially supports national planning and programming outputs. However, equally difficult for the Programming and Planning offices, whose activities tend to be more fixed in terms of producing cyclical outputs, is the realization that their primary substantive responses are mainly dependent upon what Performance Evaluation produces. This type of "mutually reinforcing" activity has been almost completely absent in past IC activities.

#### C. ON THE RELATIVE SIZE OF STAFF OFFICES

It is axiomatic that the strength of a staff's office be commensurate with its mission and workload. Unfortunately there is strong empirical evidence which suggests that the status of office leaders in a peer group tends to depend upon equivalence in divisional manpower. This latter instance can and must be overcome in the reorganized IC Staff. At Tab A is a statement of mission and responsibilities of each of the ICS Offices, on which the following comments are based:

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### Plans

The Office of Plans will tend to have the fewest professionals. One professional is required to monitor each of the functional plans; each of these professionals will also be required to develop one of the groupings in the integrated plan, e.g., current capabilities, mid-term, and long-range. An additional professional will be assigned to the National/Tactical Interface problem. One of the office professionals can also serve as Deputy to the Director, Office of Plans.

### Resources and Programming

The Office of Resources and Programming will tend to have a lesser number of professionals than the current MPRRD, to handle primarily the tools and products it has already developed minus its current evaluation functions. The HUMINT Branch should become the permanent staff of the Human Sources Committee.

### Performance Evaluation

As the primary supporting office, the Performance Evaluation Division should tend to have the largest number of professionals. Its primary evaluation activities should evolve around the KEP in support of programming and evaluation of current capabilities, a planning evaluation program in support of plans (yet to be developed), the activities in support of crisis and warning mechanisms, and evaluations in support of the production function. PE personnel will come from functions currently being handled in MPRRD, CPAD, and PRD.

### Coordination

The Coordination Staff manpower, under the Chief of Staff, will tend to remain relatively stable, although some increase may be needed if it is to carry the increased role demanded by the unified staff program. On the other hand, some of its functions can also be transferred to the Plans or Resources and Programming Offices.

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#### D. ON THE ACTION OFFICER SYSTEM

The action officer system is a method of handling executive staff actions (both steady state and ad hoc) which is designed to affix responsibility to individuals as well as organizations and assure that communication within an executive staff is optimized. The Office of the Secretary of Defense relies heavily upon this system. As with any other executive systems, its successful operation is dependent upon a certain amount of system discipline or, to put it another way, someone to see that the game is being played according to the rules. However, once the system is established, like many others, it tends to be self-policing, since the status of the players is involved if infractions occur.

The action officer system assumes that there is some mechanism for the assignment of staff actions. The assignment mechanism is the staff method for determining who the primary action officer and collateral action officers are. The mechanism should be fairly explicit, especially with respect to priority steady-state functions such as can be noted in the Primary Mission statements in the IC organization chart following this section. There will always be some questions with regard to action assignment, particularly on ad hoc actions. However, here again there must be a mechanism in the front office to determine action assignments--this can be done at a morning staff meeting or it can be the specific responsibility of the Chief of Staff, Executive Officer or the Special Assistant. The important point again is to affix responsibility for the initial assignment with an explicit set of rules which provides the framework for assignment, action procedures, and action sign-off.

To the outsider (and even to some insiders), it might appear that IC Staff now operates under an action officer system. However, the difference between having action officers and having an action officer system is the difference between undisciplined and disciplined, shared fixed responsibility vs single individual component responsibility, full communication vs limited communication.

How do we build such a system? The first step is to review the current assignment system and reorganize it to ensure someone is specifically responsible. There should be a set of explicit rules to the game, and everyone on the Staff should know what they are.

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The second step is to make sure every priority action (steady state or ad hoc) has an IC Office designated as specific collateral action officer when primary action is not assigned. Also make sure that the collateral action officer gets the message.

The third step is to formalize the procedure for action sign-off. This is where most action officer systems break down and lose their effectiveness. The formalized action sign-off is not just there to let the boss know that the collateral action officer has seen the action product. It is there to assure the boss that: (a) the collateral action officer agrees with the product or his dissenting views are present and identified, (b) someone besides the primary action officer/component has had a hand in the action, e.g., actions are being work-shared, and (c) who specifically is responsible.

The fourth step is the most important one of all to some students of management. The front office should feed back to the primary and collateral action officers a copy of the final action as it leaves the staff, e.g., to make sure the action officers know what the final decision was on the action. If this step is not formalized, more than the effectiveness of the action officer system is at stake. Mr. McNamara felt so strongly about this that he formalized the sign-off of action components on all of his decisions.

There is a tendency for primary action officers to dominate actions and a corresponding tendency for office chiefs to give inadequate attention to their collateral action officer assignments. There is only one way around this one. The boss must make it known that collateral action officers and offices are equally responsible for action entering his office, e.g., the next time an action is not to the Chief's liking, he should call in ALL the action officers and their office chiefs and give them the message.

#### E. ON AD HOC ACTIONS

The formal or steady state planning, programming, and evaluation activities of the staff will always be interrupted by ad hoc actions and current crises. Each ad hoc action should be examined to determine its relationship, possible meaning, and impact on the corporate program and strategy. This "immediate" type of analysis should be assigned on a

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"respond as appropriate" basis, probably to all offices with a response to the Chief of Staff and communication through the staff meeting.

One great problem with ad hoc actions is that there is a tendency to make them the immediate focal point of staff activity rather than to place them in perspective. There is also a tendency on the part of those who receive the primary action responsibility for ad hoc actions to develop activities which are independent of other office activities and the overall staff program. How can we guard against this?

The Community can kill IC Staff effectiveness most swiftly by just sending us mail and asking for our comments. We must not turn every paper of this sort into an ad hoc action. It is clear that we need an ad hoc "watchdog" somewhere and a sympathetic ear for every staff man's question as to "why we are answering this particular mail?" This is certainly the job of every primary and collateral action officer. However, it requires a specific focal point of responsibility in the front office.

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Office of Plans

I. Primary Mission

- A. To support the DCI by maintaining a National Foreign Intelligence Planning System.
- B. To participate with OMB, and as appropriate DOD, State, and CIA in the preparation of the National Foreign Intelligence Planning System and its output.
- C. To integrate and coordinate planning as appropriate with the support of USIB/IRAC Committees and other IC Staff elements.

II. Principal IC Action Responsibilities

- A. Develop and prepare a National Foreign Intelligence Plan and coordinate and integrate designated functional plans as appropriate.
- B. Prepare and further develop the DCI's Mid-Term Priorities as presently presented in DCID 1/2 supplement.
- C. Develop and prepare DCI guidance to the NFIP for long-range estimates and perspectives (ten years beyond the mid-term period).
- D. Serve as the DCI's representative on actions related to the National-Tactical interface problem and studies.

III. Collateral Action Responsibilities

- A. Support and review preparation of the NFIBR and IC Staff support to Congressional Committees.
- B. Support performance evaluations of current capabilities and review overall National Foreign Intelligence Performance preparations.
- C. Review and comment, as appropriate, on all ad hoc performance evaluations.

— Office of Resource and Programming

I. Primary Mission

- A. To support the DCI by maintaining a National Foreign Intelligence Programming System and Resource Review Cycle.
- B. To participate with OMB, and as appropriate DOD, State, CIA, and other interested agencies in the preparation of fiscal guidance for intelligence programs.
- C. To integrate National Foreign Intelligence planning and performance evaluations, as appropriate, in the National Foreign Intelligence Program and reporting.

II. Principal IC Action Responsibilities

- A. Prepare the NFIPR presenting the DCI recommendations with respect to (a) resources required for the tasks facing US intelligence, (b) evaluation of National Foreign Intelligence output against proposed resources, (c) DCI planning and strategic guidance related to programming and budgeting, and (d) issues meriting Presidential attention.
- B. Prepare and coordinate IC Staff support to the DCI in presenting his planning, programming, and budgeting to appropriate Congressional Committees.
- C. Manage and operate the Consolidated Intelligence Resources Information System (CIRIS)
- D. Provide direct assistance to the DCI in IRAC meetings; chair IRAC Working Group.

III. Collateral Action Responsibilities

- A. Support as needed Current Capabilities Planning and review of all National Foreign Intelligence Planning.
- B. Support as needed Performance Evaluations of Current Capabilities and review all National Foreign Intelligence Performance Evaluations.
- C. Review and comment, as appropriate, on all ad hoc performance evaluations.

Office of Performance Evaluation

I. Primary Mission

- A. To support the DCI by developing and maintaining a National Foreign Intelligence performance evaluation system.
- B. To develop and establish a Community performance evaluation sub-system in support of National Foreign Intelligence programming -- one which deals with the experienced performance of current capabilities of intelligence activities as they relate to substantive objectives, especially as stated in the Key Intelligence Questions.
- C. To develop and establish a Community performance evaluation sub-system in support of National Foreign Intelligence planning -- one which deals with expected performance evaluation of planned intelligence activities as they relate to substantive priorities in the mid-term plan and long-range perspectives.
- D. To develop and perform such ad hoc performance evaluations related to intelligence activities as may be needed to support the DCI -- especially related to Crisis Response and Post Mortems.

II. Principal IC Action Responsibilities

- A. The development and preparation of all National Foreign Intelligence performance evaluations -- especially with respect to the Key Intelligence Question Evaluation Program (KEP) and the National Foreign Intelligence Planning Issues Evaluation Program (PEP).
- B. All IC Staff matters related to KIQA and KEP.
- C. All IC Staff matters related to Crisis Response and Post Mortems.
- D. Production of the Review of National Intelligence (RONI) as required.
- E. Technical support to performance evaluations, programming and plans.

III. Collateral Action Responsibilities

- A. Support as needed in preparation of the NFIPR and IC Staff support to Congressional Committees.
- B. Support as needed in review on National Foreign Intelligence Plan.

Coordination Staff

I. Primary Mission

- A. To develop and prepare such documentation in support of the Director of Central Intelligence in his role as leader of the Intelligence Community which does not fall within the assigned missions of the other Intelligence Community Staff divisions.
- B. To provide the DCI interface with Congressional and other investigative bodies on Community aspects of U. S. foreign intelligence activities.
- C. To coordinate, or assure coordination, and review major Intelligence Community Staff activities involving more than one division of the ICS.

II. Principal Action Responsibilities


- A. Prepare the annual DCI report to the President and to the PFIAB.
- B. Revise NSCIDs and DCIDs as appropriate.
- C. Provide staff support to the DCI in his relations with the PFIAB.
- D. Draft and coordinate DCI letters of instruction to the USIB Committee chairmen.
- E. Prepare documentation on Intelligence Community matters for DCI presentation to the Congress, to the PFIAB and to other audiences as appropriate.
- F. Represent the DCI on Community aspects of support to Congressional Select Committee investigating the activities of the Intelligence Community.



- G. Coordinate, and review as appropriate, the major documentary output of the Intelligence Community Staff, including DCI guidance papers to the Community, program and performance evaluations, and external presentations.

III. Collateral Action Responsibilities

- A. Support as needed the preparation of the NFIPR.
- B. Support as needed the preparation of National Foreign Intelligence Plans.
- C. Support as needed the preparation of Performance Evaluations.



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TAB

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*Sam* [ ] : This insert in [ ] back (W)  
Thanks for making this available. I see no action for us, except to be advised.

Most of this was foreseeable and reflected in the draft E.O.'s we saw earlier. New constraints and restrictions on us were inevitable.

Points in this that strike me as new are:

- (a) the active role of Lynn (I welcome a more caring, over-sighting OMB); and
- (b) the proposed task force to look into ways of improving community leadership.

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